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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
MARIANI, District Judge.
Kenneth Britton appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 210 months’ imprisonment following
his guilty plea to multiple conspiracy counts for his involvement in an interstate
prostitution ring. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. Britton acted as a “pimp” in a
prostitution ring, which occurred from February 2001 to December 2005, involved
sixteen coconspirators and over 152 individuals, and spanned across several states. He
sold the sexual services of young girls who often “had poor home lives, had dropped out
of school, had been sexually abused, and had dismal hope for the future.” Sealed App. 6.
One prostitute in the organization, Tana Adkins, carried the label of Britton’s
“bottom bitch.” “Bottom bitches” are “prostitutes in charge of a pimp’s other prostitutes,
responsible for the recruitment, training, collection of earnings, forwarding the earnings
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to the pimp, and oversight of other prostitutes.” Id. In addition, “[w]hen called upon to do
so, the ‘bottom bitch’ will defend her territory against other prostitutes and will attack
‘renegades,’ that is, prostitutes who work without a pimp.” Id. As a result of her role in
the prostitution ring, Adkins pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy to
engage in interstate prostitution pursuant to a 33-count Superseding Indictment issued by
a federal grand jury on December 8, 2005. Id. at 3.
The Superseding Indictment named fifteen other individuals involved in the
prostitution conspiracy, including Britton. On March 1, 2006, Britton was again indicted
and charged for acts occurring in 2002, including sex trafficking of minors and interstate
transportation of a juvenile. These new charges were consolidated into the Superseding
Indictment. On September 21, 2007, Britton pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
for conspiracy to use interstate transportation with intent to engage in prostitution in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421; coercion and enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422;
and interstate travel in aid of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. He also pled
guilty to sex trafficking of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 for the acts occurring
in 2002.
In Britton’s plea agreement, the Government agreed that “[u]pon completion of
the cooperation, if the United States believes the defendant has provided ‘substantial
assistance’ pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the United
States may request the Court to depart below the guideline range.” Supp. App. (“S.A.”)
157. At sentencing, the parties noted that Britton had begun cooperating with the
Government in another case, but that his cooperation was “not complete.” S.A. 226.
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Accordingly, the Government concluded that Britton had not provided sufficient
assistance to warrant a presentence downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
However, the Government noted that a post-sentence departure under Rule 35(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for Britton’s substantial assistance could be
forthcoming. S.A. 226-27.
On January 21, 2009, the District Court sentenced Britton to 300 months’
imprisonment. Within a year of sentencing, after Britton testified against another
individual, the Government filed a post-sentence motion for downward departure under
Rule 35(b). The District Court granted the motion and reduced Britton’s sentence to 210
months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the District Court applied the 2007 Sentencing
Guidelines to all of the conspiracy counts. The 2007 Guidelines included a 2004
amendment, resulting in a harsher penalty for Britton’s 2002 crimes, which had been
incorporated into the conspiracy ending in 2005. Britton now appeals.1
II.
On appeal, Britton contends that the District Court (1) erred by applying a fourlevel enhancement for his role as “organizer or leader of a criminal activity”; (2) plainly
erred in allowing the Government to defer a motion for a downward departure for
presentence substantial assistance until after sentencing; and (3) erred by applying the
2007 Sentencing Guidelines in violation of the ex post facto clause. We address each of
Britton’s arguments in turn.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C § 1291.
4

A.
Britton first argues that the District Court erred by assigning him a four-level
enhancement for his role as an “organizer or leader” in the prostitution ring. “We review
a District Court’s factual determinations underlying the application of the sentencing
guidelines for clear error.” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 242-43 (3d Cir.
2000). “[W]e exercise plenary review over legal questions involving the proper
interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 243. “We may affirm
the rulings of the District Court for any proper reason that appears on the record even
where not relied on by it.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337 (3d Cir. 2002).
Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), a four-level enhancement is proper “[i]f the defendant
was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or
was otherwise extensive.” To qualify as “otherwise extensive,” a criminal scheme must
involve “no less than the defendant and one participant the defendant led or organized.”
Helbling, 209 F.3d at 248 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.2).2 “A ‘participant’ is a person
who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been
convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.1. Victims, including prostitutes, are often deemed
“nonparticipants.” See id. (defining nonparticipants); U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.1 (defining
victims). A victim “is considered a participant only if that victim assisted in the
promoting of a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to another
victim.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.3.

2

The test also requires qualifying “nonparticipants.” Both parties agree that the nine or
more prostitutes under Britton’s control satisfy the “nonparticipants” prong.
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The record reveals that Tana Adkins qualifies as a “participant” led or organized
by Britton because she assisted in promoting prohibited sexual conduct with respect to
other victims. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.3; United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1089
(8th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1) (holding that a prostitute qualified as a
“participant” because she “served as a trainer for [a] minor prostitute”). As a result of her
role as Britton’s “bottom bitch,” Adkins pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in interstate
prostitution. As a coconspirator, Adkins qualifies as a participant because she was
“criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app.
n.1; United States v. Levine, 983 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that four
individuals who had been recruited by the defendant-organizer and who pled guilty as
codefendants were participants “sufficient to satisfy § 3B1.1”). Accordingly, the District
Court did not err in applying a four-level sentence enhancement for Britton’s role as an
organizer or leader in the prostitution ring.
B.
Britton next argues that the Government improperly deferred making a
presentence motion for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 until after
sentencing. Because Britton did not previously raise this argument, we review for plain
error. See United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009). “Plain
error requires the defendant to demonstrate that the district court committed an error that
is plain and that affect[s] substantial rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Government has “a power, not a duty, to file a [substantial-assistance]
motion.” Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). It abuses this power “only if
6

the refusal was based on bad faith, if a plea agreement otherwise required the government
to consider offering a § 5K1.1 departure motion, or on an unconstitutional motive.”
United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655, 661 (3d Cir. 1999). Section 5K1.1 permits a
district court to grant a downward departure “[u]pon motion of the government stating
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. To determine
the appropriate sentence reduction, the court considers several factors, including “the
government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered” and “the timeliness of the
defendant’s assistance.” Id. In addition, under Rule 35(b), the government may move for
a downward departure “if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial
assistance.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (emphasis added).
Here, the Government’s decision to bring a post-sentence Rule 35(b) motion rather
than a presentence § 5K1.1 motion was not improper. The Government did not defer
bringing a § 5K1.1 motion; it expressly declined to make one given Britton’s incomplete
presentence participation. At sentencing, counsel for both parties discussed the potential
for future participation and a corresponding motion under Rule 35(b) after completion of
Britton’s assistance. This complied with the plea agreement, which only gave rise to the
Government’s obligation to move for downward departure “[u]pon completion of the
cooperation.” S.A. 157; see also U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (listing factors including “the
timeliness of the defendant’s assistance”). Moreover, to the extent Britton argues that his
incomplete presentence assistance compelled the Government to bring, and the District
Court to consider, a presentence departure motion under § 5K1.1, that argument must
fail. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(3) (emphasizing that the court “may consider the
7

defendant’s presentence assistance” to determine whether a post-sentence departure is
warranted). Thus, the Government was not obligated to bring a presentence § 5K1.1
motion and the District Court did not plainly err by granting the Government’s postsentence Rule 35(b) motion.
C.
Finally, Britton argues that the District Court violated the ex post facto clause of
the Constitution by applying the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines to his 2002 crimes. We
exercise plenary review over legal interpretations of the Guidelines. United States v.
Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011). The ex post facto clause generally precludes
the application of a Guideline that retroactively increases the punishment for a
defendant’s crimes. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013). The date of the
last overt act in a conspiracy as a whole, rather than the last overt act by the defendant, is
the controlling date for ex post facto clause purposes. United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d
1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1989).3
Here, Britton’s 2002 crimes were incorporated into the conspiracy, which ended in
2005. The District Court applied the 2007 Guidelines to all of the conspiracy counts
because the Guidelines did not materially change between 2005 and 2007. The 2007
Guidelines reflected a 2004 amendment that resulted in a harsher penalty when applied to

3

“Under the substantive law of conspiracy in this Circuit, one who willfully enters an
agreement to commit a crime remains a participant in the agreement unless and until he
communicates or otherwise objectively manifests a decision to renounce the agreement.”
Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1069 (citation omitted). Britton presents no evidence that he
affirmatively renounced his participation before the conspiracy ended in 2005.
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Britton’s 2002 crimes. Under Rosa, this did not violate the ex post facto clause because
the last overt act in the conspiracy occurred in 2005, after the 2004 amendment. See
Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1065. Thus, the District Court did not err in applying the 2007
Guidelines.4
III.
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be
affirmed.

4

We find no merit in Britton’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Peugh
invalidates the application of Rosa. In Peugh, the Court held that, although the Guidelines
are now advisory and not mandatory, the ex post facto clause still applies to a retroactive
application of a harsher Guidelines range. 133 S. Ct. at 2084. Nothing in Peugh supports
Britton’s counterintuitive argument that rules existing and constitutionally permissible
when the Guidelines were mandatory violate the ex post facto clause because the
Guidelines are now advisory. We will not hold so here. Nor will we revisit our sound
precedent in Rosa.
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